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Industrial relations legislation in 1984 
W C Hodge* 
This note outlines and discusses the nzajor changes in industrial relations legislation 
to take place in JVew Zealand during 1984. 
The year 1984 was characterised n1ore by electoral can1paign than by legislative 
passage. The snap election of 14 July 1984, which produced the only rnid-year change 
of government in recent New Zealand history, abridged the legislative programme of the 
outgoing National Government, and left the incoming Labour Governn1ent with insuf-
ficient time to effect its own statutory schedule. 
There were, therefore, 2 much abbreviated parliamentary sessions in 1984, and they 
will be discussed here separately and labelled Mark I (National) and Mark II (Labour). 
1984 Mark I (National) 
The outgoing National Party adn1inistration of Sir Robert Muldoon completed the 
third reading of and gubernatorial signature to only 2 bills before the June break-up of the 
fortieth Parliament. One, the hnprest Supply Act, is a standard and typical annual legis-
lative event; the second, the \\'hangarei Refinery Expansion Project Disputes Act (hereafter, 
the WREPDA), is absolutely unprecedented and unique for any legislative year in any 
Comrnonwealth country. 
Before surveying the background of WREPDA, its preamble and 4 provisions will 
explain its peculiar significance. The WREPDA is enacted because: 
... work on the expansion of the \Vhangarei Refmery at Marsden Point is effectively 
at a standstill: and [because] it is in the public interest that work on the expansion of 
that refinery be resumed as soon as possible and continued and that provision be made 
for compliance with terms and condtions of employment and for the observance of 
procedures for settling industrial disputes that arise in relation to that work. 
Four of the salient provisions. with their legalisms paraphrased, are set out below: 
(1) It statutorily directs all project workers to report for work on 13 June 1984, with a 
penalty imposed on those who fail to comply and who cannot prove a reasonable 
excuse (sections 3 and 7); 
(2) it adds terms and conditions to the collective agreement made by the parties; (section 
2(3)); 
(3) it names 8 individuals, all engineering scaffolders, who are not to be discrilninated 
against by other workers (section 2(3)(a)); and 
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it enables police constables above tb.tJ 
pickets, with potential penalties of 3 
Since the background to the legislatioa fJ rafl 1 
out first the details of matters which led to the site 
ing with legislation itself. 
New Zealand's only facility for "craclda&" U., ... ·-filii elL ~ .. 
petrol products is the refinery at Mars<loa qa . C1J 
Whangarei Harbour. That facility is wholly t1tt lllf 
which in turn is owned (68.6 percent) by the m.gor on compaatea (Mobil. 19.2 perceat; 
Shell, 17.1 percent; BPNZ 15 .I percent; Caltex, 8.6 percent; Buropa, 8.6 perjlellt) and 
individual investors (31.4 percent). 
The owners of NZRC, together with the government, recopdaed a need to explnd 
the Marsden Point facility to: 
(I) increase production quantitatively; 
(2) increase the range of raw crudes that could be refined; and 
(3) broaden the range of product mix, to include higher octane kerosene and a¥Jation fuels. 
The NZRC awarded the expansion project contract (then estimated to cost S103S 
million) to an overseas joint venture, Badger-Chiyoda, based respectively in The Hague, 
Holland; and Yokohama, Japan. Badger-Ciliyoda as the main contsactor then sub-con-
tracted to Joint Venture II (JVII), which is a partnenhip of and "tile 
consortium", being 5 of New Zealand's largest construction compaaiea (Fletcher CoDStruc-
tion, McConnell Dowell, Robert Stone, Wilkins and Davies, and Downer). 
Labour relations at the site in early 1984 were taut, for 2 reaons. First, an inherent 
feature of any "Think Big" project was a national spotUgb.t, with all acton conacious of 
their leading roles on a nation-wide, precedent-setting stage. Therefore, as large as the pro-
ject itself was, each site dispute was played out in a far larger context. There were no 
quiet solutions; there were no insignificant disputes. Second, one of the umesolved 
matters in dispute concerned accommodation and accommodation aDowanoes. Many 
sub-contractors were happy to pay an accommodation allowance based on an average 
Whangarei rental, while union leadership was concerned that such cash in hand, as opposed 
to guaranteed company housing, would compromise the bargairdng position of any dis-
missed worker who wished to contest that dismissal. 
The catalyst which activated the unstable elements described abQve was the double 
legal persona of one of the aforementioned sub-contractors, Bob Duncan Scaffolders 
(BDS). The sub-contractor, BDS, had given notice of concurrence with the sl1e agreement 
and had been accepted in turn. Eight employees of BDS, all scaffolders, were observed to 
be working on site on a Saturday, in apparent violation of an informal site ban on over-
time. Furthermore their employment may have been for the non-concurring Whangarei 
Scaffolding Limited (WSL), an incorporated version of BDS. It was this event which 
triggered the site walk-out, the televised clashes between pickets and police, and scenes 
of a semi-armoured van conveying the 8 scaffolders to and from the site through m888 
pickets. 
It was in this atmosphere of crisis that the WREPDA was p888ed, and signed on 12 
June 1984. The language, and "feel" of the legislation is that of wartime emergency -
"workers shall report for work on 13 June" [emphasis added) - and the imperative/ 
punitive clauses have the ring of indentured servitude. As a political document it has the 
odour of a "who's going to run the country - a few union leaders or the elected govern-
ment of New Zealand?" pre-election manifesto. 
On the other hand, the vast majority of the workforce did return to work on the 
appointed day; productivity did increase significantly after the return to worki and tha 
penalty for non-return (in section 7) was a mere 4 months' dilentitlement to the unem· 
ployment benefit (especially insignificant, in light of the SocJal Security Act provisions 
which allow up to 12 weeks' standing down time for voluntary unemployment in any 
case); and many, not all on the management side, might be heard to eay that workora took 
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the Act as an opportunity to save face and return to work. 
Taken as a whole, the \VREPDA simply dictates that both parties will abide by the 
agreetnent they already agreed to abide by. The new terms, set out in section 2( 3 ), express 
tenns itnplied in any contract of ernploytnent and contain nothing oppressive. Paragraph 
(b), for exarnple, purports to forbid "dangerous conduct'' towards any of the 8 scaffolders 
named in paragraph (a), but intentional or negligent dangerous conduct tO\\'ard a co-
worker would be rnisconduct and grounds for dismissal in any contract of employment, 
and may well be a crin1e. 
In any event, in this writer's opinion, the WREPDA is of no significance to industrial 
law and industrial relations generally. It has no legal import to anyone but the parties to 
the JVII Collective Agreen1ent and the project workers covered thereby. It will soon be 
relegated to the musuen1 of parliamentary oddities, a historical hiccup of the 1984 elec-
toral campaign. 
1984 Mark II (Labour) 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the 1984 session of the forty-first NZ Parlia-
Jnent was the Sherlock Holn1esian dog who barked in the night (Sir A C Doyle, Silver 
Blaze), or, the conspicuous absence of Labour's promised repeal of the "voluntary 
unionisn1" of National's Industrial Relations Amendment Act 1983 , as reinforced by the 
Wages Protection Act 1983. As a n1atter of practicality, the r,epeal was a step best done 
quickly, if done at all. 
Thousands of contracts of employment have been entered into since 1 February 1984, 
contracts which have never included an unqualified preference clause and the complica-
tions of reversal have thereby intensified. (The European Court, in Young, Janzes and 
Webster v UK (1981) would probably have distinguished a contract where the state \Vas 
directing con1pulsory men1bership as a fresh term, as opposed to a contract wher,e com-
pulsory membership was being reintroduced after a short gap). 1n addition, the Human 
Rights Comn1ission (1985) in its discussion paper has suggested that the right to associate 
includes a negative right not to be associated by compulsion. 1 And as the decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Young, Janzes and Webster becomes better known 
in New Zealand political opposition to unqualified preference will increasingly take the 
fonn of principled opposition. Perhaps Labour found some utility in delay during the 
wage round as an inducement to the trade union n1ovement to adhere to government 
guidelines. 
The Labour Government did pass an Industrial Relations Amendment Act in 1984, 
(hereafter, IRAA) and consequential an1endments to the Agricultural Workers Act 1977, 
the Aircrew Industrial Tribunal Act 1971, and the Waterfront Industry Act 1976. These 
3 consequential amendments are described below, following a brief discussion of the 
IRAA. 
The principal features of the IRAA are adjusttnents to institutional n1achinery, not 
substantive changes in parties' rights and liabilities. Section 3 inserts a new part IIA, with 
12 sections, into the principal Act to provide a statutory basis for an annual sun1mit con-
ference of the central wage fixing organisations. Section 16A directs that the Minister of 
Labour shall arrange a Tripartite Wage Conference, each year, between the government , the 
central organisations of both public and private employees (in CSU and the FOL or their 
successors in interest), the central organisation of employers and the State Services Co-
1. "The law should protect rights to freedom of speech and association but should not compel 
anybody to exercise them. Accordingly, as far as trade unions and human rights are concerned, 
the protection of human freedom should come first. From a human right~ point of view, the law 
should encourage, but no coerce, men and women to take an active part in determining conditions 
in which they live and work. Equally the law should protect people from being constrained to 
join any association including an industrial union''. (p. 11) 
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ordinating Committee. Attendance is not cmapma., ,_ _ _.,...lalt...,. 
16A{4) provides that no meeting shall takeplaceifa&yaaeef41ae,- • 
The minister must also give public notioe of the Tripl1&tae •• (a.aimn 
I6E), and must make submissions made by any peraoa . Tripar-
tite Wage Conference, which is to be chaired by a Mmtlt• of 'dle CroWD (aect1011 16BJ 
shall be a forum for consultations about "the economic envfronmeat" aad ''the govem-
ment's economic policies" as they effect wages and condltlona of employment (sectioD 
I6G). The consultations must relate to inflation, income dtatnbutioa, the 
of New Zealand industry, the implications of the soverament policies, unemployment, 
and the interests of low-paid workers (section 16G and H). The Tripartite Wqe Con-
ference may make conclusions and recommendations, if arrived at unantmouslJ (section 
161), but to the extent that any such recommendation is a percentage "guideline", that 
percentage shall operate as a guide to wage-fiXing tribunals, but shaJJ not have "any greater 
standing". (Section I6J ). 
In addition to this potentially useful annual summit conference, the 1984 IRAA also 
makes institutional adjustments to the constitution of the Arbitration Court, perhaps 
anticipating a 4 judge court, by providing for temporary nominated members, as well 
as acting nominated members (as per the 1977 IRAA). Section 7 of the 1984 Act ex-
pands, and markedly changes the concept of voluntary settlmnents (section 65 of the 
principal Act) by allowing reference to the court on unresolved issues; issues then to be 
treated as part of the voluntary settlement. Section 8 of the 1984 Act extends the useful-
ness of composite agreements (a special type of voluntary agreement under section 66 of 
the 1973 Act) by allowing latecoming unions and employers to become parties to a regis-
tered agreement during its currency, and by allowing a union to withdraw by giving 7 days' 
notice (section 66( 11 )). An interesting feature of conciliated settlements, per section 82 
of the principal Act, as inserted by section 10 of the 1984 IRAA, is a requirement for the 
assessors to memorialise any wage increases, for reasons for such increase, and a quan-
tification of the components that go into such increase, such memorandum to be delivered 
to the Secretary of Labour, the central organisations and the Court. Section 13 of the 
1984 IRAA amends section 84 of the principal Act by prohibiting a withdrawal (at the 
reference stage) under section 7 6 of the principal Act. 
Perhaps the primary substantive changes of note, contained in section 16 and 17 of 
the I984 IRAA, amend, respectively, section 115 ("Dispute of Rights") and section 117 
{"personal grievances") of the principal Act by allowing the parties to measure and taylor 
their own disputes clause and personal grievance machinery, in lieu of the standard clauses 
set out in section I16 and section II 7( 4). The standard clauses will still be inserted into 
awards and agreements if the parties choose not to fashion one of their own. 
Finally, in a marked change in political-economic policy, a new section 86A directs 
the court, when making an award under section 86, to have regard to "the supply and 
demand factors for the skills of the workers" concerned, and not to be bound by historical 
precedent and practice. Other factors the court is directed to take into account include 
fairness and equity, changes in job content, changes in productivity and technology, and 
relativities. 
The consequential amendments, referred to above, in relation to the Agricultural 
Workers Act, the Aircrew Industry Tribunal Act, and the Waterfront Industry Act, are 
of a piece with the just noted section 86A. The respective wage-fiXing tribunals in the 
3 industries are to take account of supply and demand factors and are not be bound by 
historical precedent and practice. 
In sum, then, it can be argued that National's 1984 legislation (the WREPDA) is 
characterised by intervention and the substitution of state direction for agreement between 
the parties. Labour's 1984 legislation (the IRAA and 3 consequential amendments) is 
characterised by loosening restraints on bargaining, giving greater scope for parties to 
create their own dispute resolution machinery, and directing wage fiXers to follow the 
market place instead of historical practice. 
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